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Workers' Compensation and the
Compensability of Attenuated Injuries: "One
man's stress is another man's pleasure"t

The compensability of stroke-related deaths in workers' compensation
cases is a hotly contested matter,' and the compensability of strokes
precipitated by so-called job-stress has run a dividing line between
Georgia courts.2 This Article will provide the reader with the history
of the law which gave rise to this particular issue and develop the
controversy while determining the reasoning behind the opposing
opinions. This Article will also provide the reader with some insight into
the practical effects of a Georgia Supreme Court decision on this issue
one way or another.
In order to aid the reader in a more complete understanding of this
issue and its implications, this Article will rely upon a "case study"
taken from a pending case before an Administrative Law Judge (AJ)
in a district of Georgia. The purpose of the case study is to give the
reader a concrete example of the issue and dispel any ambiguities that
may arise in a purely law-oriented discourse. The case study will be
extremely specific, so this Article will attempt to incorporate as much of
the law surrounding this issue while treating the case study as an
undercurrent that flows through the entire Article as a concrete
anchoring point.
This Article will first analyze the history of the law that led to the
issue in point, including much of the generic law surrounding all of
workers' compensation. Beginning with the Georgia Code's authorization

t. Essence of Stress, THE LANCET, Dec. 25, 1994, at 1713.
1. See the lengthy dissent of Judge Andrews in Reynolds Constr. Co. v. Reynolds, 218
Ga. App. 23, 27, 459 S.E.2d 612, 615 (1995) for an example.
2. For cases allowing compensation for stress related strokes, see Reynolds Constr. Co.
v. Reynolds, 218 Ga. App. 23, 459 S.E.2d 612 (1995) and Georgia Bureau of Investigation
v. Worthington, 149 Ga. App. 168,255 S.E.2d 99 (1979); for cases disallowing compensation
for stress related strokes, see Sutton v. B & L Express, 215 Ga. App. 394, 450 S.E.2d 859
(1994), Tracor Co. v. Brown, 163 Ga. App. 32, 292 S.E.2d 479 (1982), and Kines v. City of
Rome,96 FCDR 1542 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996).
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of certain types of injuries as compensable, this Article will detail the
emergence of heart attack and stroke cases in workers' compensation law
and then proceed to cases dealing with work-related stress.4
After detailing the history of stress-related strokes in workers'
compensation claims, this Article will discuss the compensability of
strokes in workers' compensation from the viewpoint of decided cases as
well as from an independant analysis of the law.5 Job stress will be the
next subject this Article discusses using the same analysis. Finally, this
Article will provide a suggested solution to the division of the courts on
this issue. This solution will be supported by the plain language of the
law and overwhelming medical opinion as well as public policy considerations.

I. THE CASE STUDY8
John and Jane Smith were married, divorced, remarried (to each
other), and redivorced. The second divorce was the result of strained
relations between the couple when John became involved in a meretricious relationship. John and Jane had three children, one of whom
suffered a handicap that left her permanently disabled. After their
second marriage, John worked for the police department as a sergeant
on the midnight shift. One year later, John became a forensic specialist
and worked eight-hour shifts but was on call twenty-four hours a day.
John later became an administrative assistant to the police chief. The
latter position was a desk job that did not involve the traditional aspects
of law enforcement, such as arrests or criminal investigations. For
several years, John also worked part-time jobs to supplement his income,
both before and after his final divorce.
John smoked for eighteen years and was diagnosed with high blood
pressure a year before he quit smoking. John had been taking
medication for his high blood pressure for two years before his death,
and in the last week preceeding his death, he doubled the medication at
the insistence of his doctor. John had beef four or more times a week

3.

O.C.GA. § 34-9-1(4) (1992 & Supp. 1996).

4. These cases usually, if not always, concern either heart attacks or strokes in
conjunction with stress and the bearing that work-related stress has on such injuries.
5. The independent analysis mentioned will not only be what the name implies--an
analysis of the compensability of strokes in workers' compensation from the viewpoint of
the statutory law apart from case law-it will also be a re-evaluation of the case law on
point.

6. In an attempt not to obstruct the processes of the pending case upon which this
Article is based, the names of the parties will be altered, but the relative facts will remain
as true to their nature as possible.
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and used salt on his food. Jane flavored their vegetables with margarine
and prepared the food with salt.
After the final divorce, Jane confronted John about his meretricious
relationship, and he admitted that he had been seeing someone else.
John was angry when Jane told him he was spending too much time
with his girlfriend and was neglecting the children. There was tension
between John and Jane after the divorce when they met to exchange the
children.
Under the divorce decree, John only had visitation rights with the
three children. Ten percent of John's salary was sent to Jane for the
support of the children. John also provided medical support for the
children, paying fifty percent of their medical bills after the insurance
payment. John was described as not laid back or relaxed, but busy. He
took his job seriously and was a very conscientious person. Jane also
admitted that John was "a gung-ho deputy" and "a real go-getter."
While working as a forensic specialist, John was involved in many
physical situations and would come home wound up. Jane stated that
John's job as an administrative assistant was also stressful.
II. THE SETTING
In order for the reader to grasp the intricacies of the ensuing
discussion, some background information is necessary.7 The burden of
proof in a workers' compensation case is on the claimant to show that
the "employee suffered an accidental injury which arose out of and in the
course of his employment."' The employer takes the employee as he
finds him, regardless of knowledge of pre-existing infirmities." The
claimant is aided by a presumption that "'when an employee is found
dead in a place where he might reasonably have been expected to be in
the performance of his duties, it is presumed that the death arose out of

7. This background information can be found in a more exhaustive manner in any of
the Mercer Law Review, Georgia Survey editions, as there is always a pervasive article
concerning workers' compensation and new developments therein.
8. Zamora v. Coffee Gen. Hoop., 162 Ga. App. 82, 84, 290 S.E.2d 192, 193 (1982)
(quoting International Paper Co. v. Gilbourn, 144 Ga. App. 175, 176, 240 S.E.2d 722, 724
(1977)).
9. See Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Griggs, 190 Ga. 277, 9 S.E.2d 84 (1940).
Maryland Cas. Co. v. Dixon, 83 Ga. App. 172, 173, 63 S.E.2d 272, 274 (1951), further
defines this as follows: "An accident arises out of the employment when the required
exertion producing the accident is too great for the man undertaking the work, whatever
the degree of exertion or the condition of health." Id. at 173-74, 63 S.E.2d at 274 (emphasis
added).
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his employment ... .'"" However, "[tihis presumption arises only
when the death is unexplained."1
The Georgia Code excludes from its definition of injury a "disease in
any form except where it results naturally and unavoidably from the
accident" and "heart attack[s], the failure or occlusion of any of the
coronary blood vessels, or thrombosis unless it is shown by a preponderance of competent and credible evidence that any of such conditions
[heart attack through thrombosis] were attributable to the performance
of the usual work of employment.""2 In Echols v. Chattooga Mercantile
Co., 8 the Georgia Court of Appeals adopted the following definition of
"accident": "'[Accident] includes every injury except diseases not
naturally growing out of injuries arising out of and in the course of
employment .... .," The court of appeals, in Griggs v. Lumbermen's
Mutual Casualty Co.,' similarly defined accident as excluding a
disease that does not arise out of a physical injury: "A traumatic
disease, as distinguished from an ideopathic disease is one which is
caused by physical injury and is compensable."1 6
The presumption that "an employee's death arose 'out of and in the
course of his employment' if he is found dead in a place where he may
reasonably be expected to be in the performance of his employment," 7
only arises where the death is unexplained." With the rise of heart
attack and stroke claims in workers' compensation, the courts needed to
redefine the term "unexplained." According to the court in Zamora, the
death itself (i.e. the precipitating factor of the death) must be unexplained.' 9 In Odom v. Transamerica Insurance Group,2" the court
found that "[i]n the present case the death was not unexplained. The
death certificate was introduced in evidence which stated that death was
due to 'cerebral vascular accident due to hypertension.' Therefore, in
this case the presumption did not arise ......

10. Zamora, 162 Ga. App. at 84,290 S.E.2d at 193-94 (quoting InternationalPaper,144
Ga. App. at 176, 240 S.E.2d at 724).
11. Id. (quoting Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Trigg, 144 Ga. App. 74, 76, 240
S.E.2d 725, 726 (1977)).
12.

O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1(4).

13. 74 Ga. App. 18, 38 S.E.2d 675 (1946).
14. I& at 21,38 S.E.2d at 678 (quoting Hardware Mut. Cas. Co. v. Sprayberry, 195 Ga.
393, 394, 24 S.E.2d 315, 316 (1943)).
15. 61 Ga. App. 448, 6 S.E.2d 180 (1939).
16. Id. at 450, 6 S.E.2d at 182.
17. Zamora, 162 Ga. App. at 82, 290 S.E.2d at 192.
18. Id at 84, 290 S.E.2d at 194.
19. Id: at 84, 85, 290 S.E.2d at 194.
20. 148 Ga. App. 156, 251 S.E.2d 48 (1978).
21. Id. at 157, 251 S.E.2d at 49.
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Furthermore, the court in Zamora stated that
where the precipitating causative factor of a stroke is known and
explained as hypertension, the claimant is not entitled to rely upon the
presumption that the stroke "arose out of' the deceased's employment
but must submit probative evidence on the issue of the causal
connection between the stroke and the employment.'
However, if the death certificate merely stated that the cause of death
was due to "cerebral hemorrhage" and did not include the additional
opinion that the cerebral hemorrhage was due to hypertension, there
would be a finding that the claimant had a stroke, but the cause of the
stroke would be unexplained.
There are three types of evidence a claimant under the statute can
employ in order to show that the deceased's death was causally related
to his employment: (1) medical opinion, (2) lay observation and opinion,
and (3) "natural inference through human experience." 5 However,
where neither the symptoms of the stroke nor the stroke itself occurred
while the employee was carrying out his employment, the lay observation and natural inference are not available as credible evidence to prove
causation. 4 Therefore, where the "natural inference is not available
... to establish causation, the issue of causation 'becomes solely a
The policy behind this was discussed by
medical question .... ."
Judge Andrews in his dissenting opinion in Reynolds:
Whether a causal connection exists between the continuous job-related
mental stress [and the] stroke involving a cerebrovascular occlusion is
not a simple medical question about which a cause and effect relation-

22. Zamora, 162 Ga. App. at 85, 290 S.i.2d at 194.
23. Reynolds Constr. Co. v. Reynolds, 218 Ga. App. 23, 24,459 S.E.2d 612, 614(1995).
The court in Hoffman v. National Sur. Corp., 91 Ga. App. 414, 85 S.E.2d 784 (1955),
defined the "natural inference" in the following manner: The evidence must show that "the
work engaged in by the employee was sufficiently strenuous, or of such a nature that,
combined with the other facts of the case, it raises a natural inference through human
experience that it did so contribute .... " Id. at 417, 85 S.E.2d at 786. The natural
inference has also been described as "nothing more than a common-sense approach based
on 'human experience from the connection of cause and effect, and observations of human
conduct.'" Southwire Co. v. Cato, 250 Ga. 895, 899, 302 S.E.2d 91, 94 (1983) (Smith, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Guye v. Home Indem. Co., 241 Ga. 213, 216, 244 S.E.2d 864, 867
(1978)).
24. Southwire, 250 Ga. at 898, 302 S.E.2d at 93 ("we hold that the 'natural inference'
is not available where ... the symptoms of the heart attack did not occur until the
claimant had been home several hours"). See also C&G Clothing Co. v. Rewell, 173 Ga.
App. 296, 297, 325 S.E.2d 906, 907 (1985) ("[slince the heart attack occurred at home, the
natural inference from human experience does not apply").
25. Reynolds, 218 Ga. App. at 34, 459 S.E.2d at 620.
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ship may be inferred by laymen based on common sense or human
experience. It is a medical question of the sort that requires expert
medical testimony.2

A claimant will have to prove a causal relationship between the
accident and the employment through competent medical testimony. It
does not matter that other factors induced the injury, as long as the
employment contributed to those factors. 2' Furthermore, "[tihe fact
that such an attack is made more likely or probable by a pre-existing
weakened physical condition is not a ground for denying compensation,
if there is sufficient competent evidence that it was traumatic rather
than ideopathic in origin." The court in GeorgiaBureau of Inuestigation v. Worthington2' stated that where there is "inconsistent medical
opinion it is the responsibility of the board to assign weight to the
testimony of medical experts.'
The courts have long allowed recovery under workers' compensation
for stroke related injuries, 31 but job related stress as a causation of
injury is relatively new.12 Worthington set the standard for allowing
compensation for heart attacks or strokes on the basis of job stress. Job
stress was fit into the definition of injury-the disease as traumatic as

26. Id. at 33, 459 SE.2d at 619.
27. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Dixon, 83 Ga. App. 172, 174, 63 S.E.2d 272, 274 (1951).
28. Id. THE MERRIAM WEBSTER DICTIONARY 727 (3rd ed. 1974) defines 'trauma" as "a
bodily or mental injury usually caused by an external agent." "Idiopathic" is defined as
"arising spontaneously or from an obscure or unknown cause." Id. at 349. One can deduce
from the court's use of such terms that it is further restricting the definition of "injury"
under workers' compensation to one that is caused by external factors arising out of the
employment rather than internal factors upon which the employment has no effect.
29. 149 Ga. App. 628, 255 S.E.2d 99 (1979).
30. Id. at 629, 255 S.E.2d at 100.
31. The first stroke case under workers' compensation in Georgia was Bussey v. Globe
Indem. Co., 81 Ga. App. 401, 59 S.E.2d 34 (1950) (stroke was held compensable). There
have been relatively few cases dealing with strokes since then: Hartford Accident &
Indem. Co. v. Waters, 87 Ga. App. 117, 73 S.E.2d 70 (1952); Shelby Mut. Cas. Co. v. Huff,
87 Ga. App. 463, 74 S.E.2d 251 (1953); Hoffman v. National Sur. Corp., 91 Ga. App. 414,
85 S.E.2d 784 (1955); Springfield Ins. Co. v. Harris, 106 Ga. App. 422, 126 S.E.2d 920
(1962); Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Videtto, 124 Ga. App. 458, 184 S.E.2d 210 (1971);
Georgia Bureau of Investigation v. Worthington, 149 Ga. App. 628, 255 S.E.2d 99 (1979);
Tracor Co. v. Brown, 163 Ga. App. 32, 292 S.E.2d 479 (1982); and Reynolds Constr. Co. v.
Reynolds, 218 Ga. App. 23, 459 S.E.2d 612 (1995). Only nine cases in forty-six years have
dealt with strokes in workers' compensation.
32. There have been only five cases dealing directly with job-related stress in workers'
compensation claims, the first arising in 1979 in Georgia Bureau of Investigation v.
Worthington. That was a stroke case and since then only two other cases have involved
job stress and strokes-Reynolds Constr.Co. v. Reynolds and Tracor Co. v.Brown. The
other cases dealing with stress were heart attack cases: Sutton v. B&L Express, 215 Ga.
App. 394, 450 S.E.2d 859 (1994) and Kines v. City of Rme, 96 FCDR 1542 (1996).
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opposed to idiopathic-as a causative external factor produced by the
work environment. It should be noted that Worthington provided an
avenue for claimants to recover for stress related injuries where the
stress was entirely divorced from any physical exertion. This was a big
step away from the law as it stood before 1979. The court in Shelby
Mutual Casualty v. Huff," explained that the claimant must show that
some kind of exertion caused the injury
Where it is shown that the cause of death is cerebral hemorrhage or
some other disease with which exertion on the part of the employee as
shown by the evidence may be expected to concur in precipitating an
attack, and where such claimant, so suffering, exerts himself in the

course of his employment, these facts are sufficient ... to authorize an
award
.... Both the disease and the exertion must be shown, howev34
er.

The Appellate Court has further stated that the slightness of the
exertion does not matter as long as there is some exertion which
contributed to the injury,"' and it called for a determination of a causal
connection between,"any specific activity or exertion at work" and the
7 the court stated
injury 6 In Springfield Insurance Co. v. Harris,"
that "[clases involving cerebral hemorrhage have frequently been held
compensable in spite of the fact that there has been a lapse of time,
extending from a few minutes to several days, between the exertion
which it was contended precipitated the cerebral accident and the
ultimate death or disability.' S
Worthington dealt with a fifty-three year old Georgia Bureau of
Investigation agent who was primarily responsible for collecting and
submitting statistical data on crime in his district. After leaving his
house one day and enroute to a firing range, Worthington experienced
a dizzy spell. Later in the day, he experienced blurred vision, a
headache, and impairment of speech and movement. The doctors who
testified stated simply that stress contributed to the stroke.3 ' The case
of Reynolds presented a similar situation. Reynolds was a partial owner
of a construction business owned by his family. The symptoms of his
stroke occurred as he was returning home from viewing a potential job

33. 87 Ga. App. 463, 74 S.E,2d 251 (1953).
34. ld. at 465, 74 S.E.2d at 253 (emphasis added).
35. Hoffman v. National Sur. Corp., 91 Ga. App. 414, 85 S.E.2d 784 (1955).
36. Gardner v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 139 Ga. App. 107, 108, 228 S.E.2d 27,
27 (1976).
37. 106 Ga. App. 422, 126 S.E.2d 920 (1962).
38. 1d&at 422, 126 S.E.2d at 921.
39. Worthington, 149 Ga. App. at 628, 255 S.E.2d at 100.
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site. Reynolds did not exert himself in the traditional sense of physical
exertion,' and the medical testimony was that stress did not contribute
to the stroke, rather that the stroke was an effect of arteriosclerosis.4 1
Despite the medical testimony, the ALJ found the stroke compensable
as a result of job stress-to which Reynolds and his brother testified.4 2
The claimant in Kines was a police officer for the City of Rome, Georgia.
He died from a heart attack at home at least thirty-six hours after his
last work-shift." The court denied the claimant compensation, because
it found that the claimant's heart attack could have been caused by
many other congenital and idiosyncratic factors." The court in Sutton
similarly denied compensation to a truck driver who was overweight,
smoked, and had hypertension."
III. THE CASE-STUDY APPLIED
The problem that stress related strokes pose for the area of workers'
compensation is highlighted nicely by the hypothetical discussed in this
Article. The problem, presented succintly, is that the courts are allowing
as compensable a claim that is virtually impossible to verify. This
Article will try to justify an abolishment of the compensability of such
claims through a defense of the employer in the above hypothetical.
We have already seen that the Georgia Code and case law have
prohibited compensation for diseases with the exception of heart attacks,
failure or occlusion of coronary blood vessels, or thrombosis and only
where the foregoing are shown to be work-related.' Our hypothetical
claimant, John Smith, will argue that his stroke was a result of the
disease called hypertension, or high blood pressure. Such a disease preexisted his employment and was not a natural and unavoidable result
of any injury. Moreover, a stroke cannot be considered a "thrombosis,"
which can be compensable under the Code, because such term relates to
coronary thrombosis and not cerebral thrombosis.47 FDA Consumer

40. I use the phrase "traditional sense" to represent those cases that Worthington
departed from. The court of appeals seems to have recognized emotional stress as a form
of exertion which is compensable in workers' compensation.
41. Reynolds, 218 Ga. App. at 24, 459 S.E.2d at 613.
42. Id.
43. Kines, 96 FCDR at 1543.
44. Id. at 1543-44.
45. Sutton, 215 Ga. App. at 395, 450 S.E.2d at 861.
46.

O.C.G-A. § 34-9-1(4).

47. Note that there is no authority for this proposition in the Code itself, but the
common doctrines of statutory interpretation, noscitur a sociis-i.e., it is known from its
associates-and ejusdem generis-i.e.,of the same kind, class, or nature--state that a word
with an ambiguous meaning should be read in context and defined by its surrounding
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states that strokes are either hemorrhagic, embolic; or thrombotic in
origin." Since Smith's stroke was hemorrhagic in origin, it could not
be incorporated into the "thrombosis" which the Code allows to be proven
by a preponderance of competent and credible evidence. The stroke and
underlying hypertension would therefore be excluded from the purview
of the Workers' Compensation Act. However, courts have not followed
this line of reasoning and in fact have found similar strokes compensable
regardless of the Code language.4' While ignoring the language of the
Code--or refusing to analyze it-the courts have not explained the
reason for incorporating cerebral problems in the Code's scope of
"injury." Perhaps the courts have relied on the doctrine of statutory
construction which states that the drafters of the Code did not foresee
this problem and therefore omitted it. This analysis is entirely
unfounded, however, since cerebral problems (strokes in particular) have
existed as long as coronary problems. The courts have simply legislated
once again, although the end result (incorporation of cerebral problems
as a compensable "injury") may not be far from what the drafters
intended to be compensable.
The presumption that "an employee's death arose 'out of and in the
course of his employment' if he is found dead in a place where he may
6
reasonably be expected to be in the performance of his employment,'W
should not apply to our hypothetical. First, the death has to occur in a
place where the employee was likely to be in the performance of his
employment. Our claimant's stroke occurred while at home and his
death occurred later at the hospital. In neither of these places is it
reasonable to assume that the claimant was engaged in his employment.
It is important to note here that the courts have mixed the presumption
with causation issues. They have analyzed the presumption in terms of

language. WHLLIAM N. ESKRMGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 637-38 (2d ed. 1995). The

Code lists heart attacks (coronary by nature) and the failure or occlusion of coronaryblood
vessels along with thrombosis. Read in context, therefore, thrombosis refers to coronary
thrombosis rather than cerebral thrombosis.
48. FDA CONSUMER, June 1994, at 21.
49. Judge Andrews dissented in Reynolds where a claimant, on facts similar to the
hypothetical, was compensated. Judge Andrews stated that the Code
does not apply when the injury at issue is a stroke involving a cerebrovascular
occlusion. It may be argued that because the statutory list of medical conditions
concludes with the general term "thrombosis," the statute embraces conditions
unrelated to the prior enumerated coronary problems and could be construed to
include a thrombosis or occlusion of a cerebral vessel. However, I find no evidence
that the Legislature intended this broad construction.
Reynolds, 218 Ga. App. at 28, 459 S.E.2d at 616 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
50. Zamora v. Coffee Gen. Hosp., 162 Ga. App. 82, 82, 290 S.E.2d 192, 192 (1982).
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whether the employment could have had an impact on the injury
regardless of its removal from the actual injury"' If taken at face
value, the presumption should be applied as read, and the presumption
does not apply if the claimant is found dead at home or in a hospital.6
Second, the death must be unexplained in order for the presumption to
be valid." This only applies where the death itself (i.e. the precipitating factor of the death) is unexplained." In Odom v. Transamerica
Insurance Group," the court found that "[in the present case the death
was not unexplained. The death certificate was introduced in evidence
and stated that death was due to 'cerebral vascular accident due to
hypertension.' Therefore, in this case the presumption did not arise
....
Furthermore, the court in Zamora stated that
[w]here the precipitating causative factor of a stroke is known and
explained as hypertension, the claimant is not entitled to rely upon the
presumption that the stroke "arose out of" the deceased's employment
but must submit probative evidence on the issue
of the causal
57
connection between the stroke and the employment.
However, if the death certificate merely stated that the cause of death
was due to "cerebral hemorrhage" and did not include the additional
opinion that the cerebral hemorrhage was due to hypertension," there
would be a finding that the claimant had a stroke, but the cause of the
stroke would be unexplained."
Smith's death was explained as a cerebral hemorrhage on his death
certificate, but there was no language indicating a secondary cause.
However, Smith had been diagnosed with hypertension before his death,

51. This will be discussed in more detail when causation is discussed, infra. The heart
attack and stroke cases have posed a problem for the courts in determining whether the
presumption applies. Many times, the actual injury-heart attack or stroke-does not
occur until the claimant has already returned home.
52. There is no reason not to apply the presumption as it reads. To extend the
presumption to cover heart attacks or strokes which occur at home but may have been
precipitated by some exertion at work would be to destroy the presumption. In other
words, there would always be a presumption in heart attack and stroke cases.
53. Zamora, 162 Ga. App. at 84, 290 S.E.2d at 194.
54. Id. at 84, 85, 290 S.E.2d at 194.
55. 148 Ga. App. 156, 251 S.E.2d 48 (1978).
56. Id. at 157, 251 S.E.2d at 49.
57. Zamora, 162 Ga. App. at 85, 290 S.E.2d at 194.
58. This includes the case where hypertension actually is the precipitating factor, but
the doctor omitted mention of such.
59. What purpose this serves is unknown. The court will look at the face of the death
certificate to determine whether the death is explained. It seems that a proper inquiry
would allow the testimony of the doctor who diagnosed the death as well as the certificate
itself.
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and his doctor told him to double the blood pressure medication before
he died; that is the most likely reason for the stroke. If the employer
can argue effectively that hypertension was the underlying cause of
Smith's stroke, then the presumption would not be available to Smith.
Smith would only have to show the court that the death certificate
stated "cerebral hemorrhage" as the only cause of death in order to use
the presumption. However the claimant must prove both (1) that the
deceased was found in a place where a reasonable person could infer
that he was carrying out his employment and (2) that deceased's death
was unexplained. In the hypothetical, the claimant should not be able
to use the presumption.'
Smith should only be able to employ one of the three types of evidence
available."1 As has already been noted, supra, where neither the
symptoms of the stroke nor the stroke itself occurred while the employee
was carrying out his employment, the lay observation and natural
inference are not available as credible evidence to prove causation. 2
Since the symptoms and actual stroke did not occur until the hypothetical claimant was at home, the only evidence available to establish
causation is medical opinion.
TV

THE PROBLEM

The claimant will have to prove a causal relationship between the
stroke and Smith's employment through competent medical testimony.
However, the thrust of this Article is that any medical evidence which
states that work related stress could have contributed to the stroke is
inconclusive. Nevertheless, courts have allowed such evidence to be
admitted and have held injuries compensable based on that evidence.
The court in Worthington stated that when there is "inconsistent medical
opinion it is the responsibility of the board to assign weight to the
The Administrative Law Judge should
testimony of medical experts.'
not, however, assign weight to any medical opinion in a case involving
the issue whether stress could have caused a stroke; medical journals
have consistently shown that the effect of stress on hypertension and
strokes is unknown. Stress is idiosyncratic and has not been proven to
exacerbate or cause hypertension or strokes. In an editorial, The Lancet

60. But again, courts have mixed the presumption issue with causation issues. The
result should be as this Article states, but the court may confuse itself and the parties and
find the presumption a valid one.
61. The three types are (1) medical opinion, (2) lay observation and opinion, and (3) the
natural inference through human experience.
62. Southwire Co. v. Cato, 250 Ga. 895, 898, 302 S.E.2d 92, 93 (1983).
63. Worthington, 149 Ga. App. at 629, 255 S.E.2d at 100.
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discussed this point: "Whether high physiological stress responsivity is
a cause or effect of hypertension is, however, far from clear .... I
Furthermore, studies have shown the possibility that hypertension itself
can be the cause of stress in people with family histories of stress."
The article concluded with the adage, "One man's stress is another man's
pleasure.'
Bruce Charlton of Glasgow University described stress as having
"little real value, serving mainly to confuse and confound rational
thought.' 7 Charlton further described stress as "being used to indicate
(or disguise) an ignorance of mechanisms.'
Furthermore, "in most socalled stress situations, experiments have not even been done to
establish any objective correlates ... of the stress. Stress as a unified
response has been watered-down to a vague, undefined subjectively
unpleasant feeling .... ."
Charlton concluded that "[wihen stress is
allowed validity it is a guarantee that the discussion will proceed at such
a level of generality that nothing specific can be said, no science can be
done, no conclusions can be drawn."70
An article in USA Today studied the effect of stress on the immune
system and found that stress is highly idiosyncratic and is influenced
mostly by personality type. The "Type A" personality, which is an
aggressive, go-getter type person like Smith, is more prone to experience
stress. The article implicitly stated that people cause their own stress
and stressors as a result of their personality and that stress can
therefore be controlled by that person. 1
Dr. Francis McCafferty concurred and stated the following about stress
and individuality:
Stress is not always harmful. It is the individual's reaction to stress
that determines the outcome, i.e., whether the individual will adapt or
become maladaptive. Individuals who feel they can control events or
are in control of their lives are better able to handle stress than

64. Essence of Stress, THE LANCET, Dec. 25, 1994, at 1713.
65. Id.
66. Id. The import of this Article-and similar articles that have reached the same
conclusion-is that stress could be caused by hypertension. If this is the case, the courts
are awarding workers' compensation to individuals whose injuries are not related to work
at all. A stroke could be caused by stress which, in turn, is caused by pre-existing
hypertension. Hypertension is an idiopathic disease, as opposed to a compensable
traumatic disease, for which a claimant will not be compensated under the Code.
67. Bruce G. Charlton, Stress, J. MED. ETHICS, Sept. 1992, at 156.
68. Id. at 157.
69. Id. (emphasis supplied).
70. Id. at 158.
71. Paul L. Devito, The Immune System v. Stress, USA TODAY, July 1994, at 27-28.
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individuals who believe they are the victims of fate or chance and who
feel powerless and helpless."
In The Role of "Stress"in Workers' Compensation Claims,7 Dr. Eliashof
stated that "[diespite the increasing number of claims for work-related
and etiology have been
stress induced illness, the characteristic features 74
minimally studied and are not well understood."
Stress is an untenable theory upon which a claim for workers'
compensation may be based. Studies have been conducted on police
personnel in order to determine work stressors and police stress. 7
PsychologicalReports published a study conducted by the Department
of Criminal Justice, Rochester Institute of Technology and Russell Sage
College, which ranked police stressors.76 The study included 103
randomly selected, ful-time sworn police officers and ranked sixty
stressors on a scale of 0-100 (zero being no stress). Some of the following
are stressors that the hypothetical claimant might have experienced with
their attendant stress level (0-100) and relative rank (1 being the most
stressful on the list, 60 being the least):
Stress Level
Description
61
1) Use of Force
43.2
2) Excessive Paperwork
41.8
3) Family Demands
33
4) Increased Responsibility
25.5
5) Politics Outside Dep't

Overall Rank
7
31
35
46
56

The situation that caused the most stress for Smith, which he reported
to his fellow workers and his ex-wife, is one of the five lowest ranked
stressors in the study--"Politics Outside Department." Smith was
worried about a county annexation of areas that were previously
patrolled by the Police Department. This is another example of an
individual creating his own stressors. Smith created a large stressor out

72.

Francis L. McCafferty, Stress and Suicide in Police Officers, S. MED. J., Mar. 1992,

at 233.
73. Byron A. Eliashof, et al., The Role of"Stress in Workers' Compensation Claims, J.
OCcUPATIONAL MED., Mar. 1992, at 297.

74. Id. at 298.
75. Most articles that deal with stress focus on police officers, truck drivers, and
hospital personnel-it has been claimed that these people have the largest stressors, and
medical investigation has consequently focused on them. This Article focuses on police
stressors, not only because it facilitates discussion of the hypothetical, but because the

studies on each of these professions is representative of the others.
76. John M. Violanti & Fred Aron, Ranking Police Stressors,Psychol. Rep., Oct. 1994,
at 824.
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of something that most police officers in the study felt was a small
stressor.
Another study of three police departments and 160 police personnel
was published by the Journalof Criminal Justice.77 This study stated
the following:
It is undeniable that police work includes moments of very high stress,

even terror, but these moments are rare. On the whole, the impact of
these moments seems to be offset somewhat by the compensation
factors that made up the civil servant cluster associated with low stress
.... When dramatic events do occur, they are often experienced as
eustress [i.e. positive stress] by officers who enjoy the excitement of the
job .... But, in general, police officers seem to experience about the
same level of stress as other people .... 7"

Smith was the type of individual who felt in control of his life and was
described as a "go-getter." Under Dr. McCafferty's theory, Smith would
have been the type of person to "adapt" rather than become "maladaptive."' 9 Bruce Charlton concurs in stating the following: "But what
happens when the same stress is repeatedly applied? Often the effects
wear off, the organism becomes 'adapted.' The stress is no longer a
stress.' ° Although Charlton is referring to physical stimuli, the
concept can be applied to psychological stimuli as well.
Our hypothetical employer should be able to show not only that police
stress is no different than any other stress, but also that Smith's stroke
was precipitated by factors exclusive of his employment. Courts have
held that injuries did not arise out of and in connection with employment when the deceased's injury was caused by his own personal
problems. A population based case-control study was conducted by
Konrad Jamrozik, which found that smoking, consuming meat more than
four times weekly, adding salt to food, and having a history of hypertension are each associated with increased risk in all strokes."'
Smith smoked, ate meat more than four times weekly, added salt to
his food, and had a history of hypertension. He met all the factors for
an increased risk of stroke, and none of these factors was attributable

77. Jerome E. Storch & Robert Panzarella, Police Stress: State-Trait Anxiety in
Relation to Occupational and PersonalStressors, J. CRIM. JuST., Mar.-Apr. 1996, at 99.
78. Id. at 106 (emphasis added).
79. See McCafferty, et al., supra, 1786-87 for the theory that individuals who feel in
control of their lives are better able to handle stress.
80. Bruce G. Charlton, Stress, J. MED. ETHICS, Sept. 1992, at 157.
81. Konrad Jamrozik, et al., The Role of Lifestyle Factorsin the Etiology of Stroke, Jan.
1994, at 51, 56, 57.
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to his employment. In Sutton v. B & L Express, 2 the court found that
there was ample evidence to support the board's denial of compensation
to the claimant. The court stated that "the board found the medical
evidence showed Sutton had multiple risk factors for coronary disease,
including hypertension, cigarette abuse, and obesity .... none of which
was shown to be attributable or related to his employment.' s
In Tracor Co. v. Brown," the court similarly affirmed the board's
denial of compensation to the claimant. It stated that the board found
"'[tihe claimant sustained his stroke while at home and he had always
been a nervous person and although this nervous condition increased
through the years,... his ultimate disability was [not] due to any jobOur claimant's stroke occurred while he was
incurred injury .... .
at home, and he had always been an intense person.
In the recent case of Kines v. City of Rome," the court of appeals
similarly upheld a denial of compensation. Although the court recognized that there was evidence that the deceased had a stressful job as
a police officer,
[t]here was also evidence that the deceased had been involved in a
meretricious relationship for four years and that his wife was pregnant

at the time of his death, facts that would reasonably generate far more
stress than would a job he had performed without physical problems
for 22 years.87

Smith was involved in a meretricious relationship after his divorce and
his children would visit while his girlfriend was at the house. Moreover,
he had the added stress of coping with his daughter's medical problems.
The AUJ should find in accordance with Sutton, Tracor, and Kines that
the claimant's injury was in no way related to his employment but was
based on personal factors which "would reasonably generate far more
stress" than his job.
V. CONCLUSION

The point of this Article" ' is to attack an area of the law which the
courts have legislated into existence. Hopefully the hypothetical was

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

215 Ga. App. 394, 450 S.E.2d 859 (1994).
Id. at 395, 450 S.E.2d at 861.
163 Ga. App. 32, 292 S.E.2d 479 (1982).
Id. at 32, 292 S.E.2d at 480.
96 FCDR 1542 (1996).
Id. at 1544.
If the reader somehow missed it in the morass of example and medical theory, here
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useful in illustrating the problems with allowing compensation for
stress-related strokes, especially when the claimant also has a history
of hypertension and other personal problems. Stress is not a disease
caused by external occurrences, and the effect of stress on hypertension
is unknown. The courts have "assumed intuitively" that stress can and
does cause hypertension and strokes; their only support has been
intuitive assumptions of doctors who are not specialists in the field of
stress and who have done no research to back their findings, which in
most, if not all, of the cases have been hypothetical statements that
stress might have an impact on hypertension and strokes.
Until research shows that stress does have an effect on hypertension
and strokes, the ALJ and the courts should not allow claimants to be
compensated for such attenuated injuries. Studies have shown that
stress is extremely individualized and influenced largely by personality
type. There is no reason for the law to compensate a person for stress
that is caused not by external factors such as employment, but by the
person himself. Stress can be controlled by the individual which causes
it; 9 the law should not allow individuals to shirk their responsibility
of self-care and then rely upon the law to provide them with compensation for their self-inflicted injuries.
JACK PRITCHARD

89. There have been many studies (which I will not list here-I am afraid the reader
may have begun wondering whether this was a law review comment or a medical thesis)
showing that there are ways for individuals to control and cure their stress.

